On the Temporal Boundaries of Simple Experiences :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

On the Temporal Boundaries of Simple ExperiencesABSTRACT I solicit that the profane boundaries of certain experiences those I skirt simple experiential reddents (SEEs) have a different character than the temporal boundaries of the events close frequently associated with experience uneasy events. In particular, I argue that the temporal boundaries of SEEs are more sharply defined than those of neural events. Indeed, they are sharper than the boundaries of all physical events at levels of multifactoriality higher than that of elementary particle physics. If correct, it follows that the most common forms of identity theory-functionalism and dualism (according to which neurophysiological (or other complex) events play key roles through identification or correlation) are mistaken. more than positively, the conclusion supports recent approaches that attempt to explicate conciousness by appeal to quantum physics. I. IntroductionA methodology that I believe has some chance of pr oviding us with a better understanding of the nature of disposition or of how it could be that soul does not exist, if the eliminativists are right is whizz in which we study our creative activity or picture of consciousness. Specifically, I am referring to our conception or picture of phenomenal consciousness what one has in mind who, e.g., gets the mind-body problem, understands the inverted spectrum or absent qualia examples, or Nagels phrase that it is like something to be conscious, and so on. Such individuals, arguably, are thinking about consciousness in a more or slight similar way, exploiting a similar conception or picture, similar conceptual structures. Studying such a conception should be, to a reasonable degree at least, just like studying every other conception in cognitive science. And, as with other conceptions, the effort can be a multidisciplinary one, one to which philosophers can contribute. As I said, I think following this route might lead to progress in our understanding of consciousness itself but even if it does not, characterizing our conception of phenomenal consciousness has greatness at least as a piece of psychology. In any event, it is how I am inclined to chase the study of consciousness these days. This talk describes a small study within that broader project.In another paper (1) I have argued that our conception of phenomenal consciousness commits us to the idea that there are simple components or elements that in some sense make up our complex phenomenal experience. Actually, it commits us to attribute that either there are simples or that our complex phenomenal experience is such that roughly put analysis will always continue ad infinitum, no matter how a complex phenomenal experience gets carved up.On the Temporal Boundaries of Simple Experiences Philosophy Philosophical PapersOn the Temporal Boundaries of Simple ExperiencesABSTRACT I argue that the temporal boundaries of certain experiences those I call s imple experiential events (SEEs) have a different character than the temporal boundaries of the events most frequently associated with experience neural events. In particular, I argue that the temporal boundaries of SEEs are more sharply defined than those of neural events. Indeed, they are sharper than the boundaries of all physical events at levels of complexness higher than that of elementary particle physics. If correct, it follows that the most common forms of identity theory-functionalism and dualism (according to which neurophysiological (or other complex) events play key roles through identification or correlation) are mistaken. More positively, the conclusion supports recent approaches that attempt to explain conciousness by appeal to quantum physics. I. IntroductionA methodology that I believe has some chance of providing us with a better understanding of the nature of consciousness or of how it could be that consciousness does not exist, if the eliminativists are right is one in which we study our conception or picture of consciousness. Specifically, I am referring to our conception or picture of phenomenal consciousness what one has in mind who, e.g., gets the mind-body problem, understands the inverted spectrum or absent qualia examples, or Nagels phrase that it is like something to be conscious, and so on. Such individuals, arguably, are thinking about consciousness in a more or less similar way, exploiting a similar conception or picture, similar conceptual structures. Studying such a conception should be, to a reasonable degree at least, just like studying any other conception in cognitive science. And, as with other conceptions, the effort can be a multidisciplinary one, one to which philosophers can contribute. As I said, I think following this route might lead to progress in our understanding of consciousness itself but even if it does not, characterizing our conception of phenomenal consciousness has importance at least as a piece of p sychology. In any event, it is how I am inclined to pursue the study of consciousness these days. This talk describes a small study within that broader project.In another paper (1) I have argued that our conception of phenomenal consciousness commits us to the idea that there are simple components or elements that in some sense make up our complex phenomenal experience. Actually, it commits us to holding that either there are simples or that our complex phenomenal experience is such that roughly put analysis will always continue ad infinitum, no matter how a complex phenomenal experience gets carved up.